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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Tapia-Lopez appeals from the district court's order denying his oral I.C.R. 
35 motion for reduction of sentence. Tapia-Lopez also challenges the Idaho 
Supreme Court's order denying his motion to augment the appellate record. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
According to a police report appended to the presentence report ("PSI"), 
on September 17, 2009, a confidential informant ("Cl") cooperating with the Mini-
Cassia Drug Task Force in Heyburn (Minidoka County), Idaho made a telephone 
call to Desiree Johns to purchase one-quarter ounce of methamphetamine. (PSI, 
p.15.) Ms. Johns called the Cl back and said it would cost $500 for the drug and 
he should go to her house to get it. (Id.) Shortly after the Cl entered Johns' 
house, Tapia-Lopez arrived in a black Mustang and went into the house through 
the back door. (Id.) While the Cl waited in Ms. Johns' bedroom with her infant 
child and 12 to 13 year old daughter, Ms. Johns asked Tapia-Lopez if $460 was 
"ok" for one-quarter ounce of methamphetamine. (Id.) The Cl and Ms. Johns 
went to another bedroom where she used digital scale to weigh the 
methamphetamine. (Id.) The Cl gave Ms. Johns $460 and she gave him a piece 
of tin foil that contained two plastic baggies of methamphetamine. (Id.) 
On September 23, 2009, the Cl arranged with Ms. Johns to buy one-
eighth ounce of methamphetamine at her house. (PSI, p.16.) When the Cl went 
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into the house, he talked to Ms. Johns, Tapia-Lopez, and an unknown male in a 
bedroom. (Id.) The Cl asked about the possibility of purchasing an ounce of 
methamphetamine in the future, and Tapia-Lopez told him it would cost $1300. 
(Id.) The Cl gave Ms. Johns $260, and Tapia-Lopez took what appeared to the 
Cl to be an ounce of methamphetamine from his pants pocket, weighed out 
some of it, and put the extra back in his pants pocket. (Id.) Ms. Johns gave the 
Cl a baggie that contained 3.9 grams of methamphetamine. 1 (Id.) 
On October 28, 2009, Tapia-Lopez was a passenger in a black Mustang 
driven by Javier Cgovano in Burley, Idaho. (PSI, pp.1-2, 17.) A Cassia County 
Sheriff's Deputy attempted to stop the vehicle after observing Cgovano commit 
some traffic violations, but the car sped away for several blocks before stopping. 
(PSI, p.2.) Tapia-Lopez informed the officer that he had convinced Cgovano to 
stop the car. (Id.) Cgovano was arrested for reckless driving, and Tapia-Lopez 
was searched. (Id.) An orange and white smoking device was found in his 
jacket pocket, and a baggie with four individual baggies that held a substance 
that field tested positive for amphetamine, were found inside the floorboard 
carpet on the passenger side of the front seat. (Id.) The bag also held two 
pipes. (Id.) Tapia-Lopez was found to possess $623.72 in cash, and a digital 
scale was located in the back seat of the car. (Id.) 
1 Although the report did not directly say it, the baggie of methamphetamine Ms. 
Johns gave to the Cl was presumably the same methamphetamine weighed out 
by Tapia-Lopez moments earlier. 
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The state charged Tapia-Lopez with two counts of delivery of a controlled 
substance (methamphetamine).2 (R., pp.18-21.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, 
Tapia-Lopez pied guilty to one Count I and the state dismissed Count II. (R., 
pp.43-57, 66-68.) The district court imposed a unified twelve-year sentence with 
three years fixed, but retained jurisdiction for one year. (R., pp.60-65.) After his 
period of retained jurisdiction, and with a favorable recommendation from NICI, 
the district court placed Tapia-Lopez on probation for the term of his suspended 
sentence. (R., pp.74-76; APSI, p.1.) About one month later, the state filed a 
motion to revoke probation based Tapia-Lopez's illegal re-entry into the United 
States after he was deported, and his failure to report to probation for 
supervision. (R., pp.81-85; Tr., p.8, Ls.3-8.) At a probation revocation hearing, 
Tapia-Lopez admitted he violated the terms of his probation as alleged. (Tr., p.4, 
L.9 - p.6, L.8.) 
Prior to disposition at the same hearing, Tapia-Lopez's counsel asked the 
court to reconsider Tapia-Lopez's original sentence and to reduce the fixed 
portion to one year (instead of three) to allow him to be turned over to federal 
authorities sooner for prosecution on federal charges. (Tr., p.4, Ls.9-17; p.7, 
Ls.13-21.) The district court ordered Tapia-Lopez's probation be revoked and his 
original sentence imposed, and also rejected his oral motion to reduce the fixed 
2 In Cassia County, Tapia-Lopez was charged with possession of a controlled 
substance (methamphetamine) with intent to deliver. (PSI, p.17.) 
3 
portion of his sentence. (R., pp.106-108; Tr., p.7, L.25- p.8, L.16.) Tapia-Lopez 
filed a timely appeal. (R., pp.109-111.) 
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ISSUES 
Tapia-Lopez states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Tapia-Lopez due 
process and equal protection when it denied his Motion to 
Augment with the requested transcripts? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. 
Tapia-Lopez's oral Rule 35 motion requesting leniency? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.3) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Tapia-Lopez failed to establish that the Idaho Supreme Court violated his 
constitutional rights by denying his motion to augment the appellate record? 
2. Has Tapia-Lopez failed to show the district court abused its discretion by 




Tapia-Lopez Has Failed To Establish That The Idaho Supreme Court Violated 
His Constitutional Rights By Denying His Motion To Augment The Appellate 
Record 
A. Introduction 
Tapia-Lopez argues that the Idaho Supreme Court violated his rights to 
due process, equal protection, and effective assistance of counsel by denying his 
motion for augmentation with transcripts of the June 28, 2010 change of plea 
hearing, the August 11, 2010 sentencing hearing, and the January 10, 2011 
"rider review" hearing. (Appellant's Brief, pp.4-18.) Because Tapia-Lopez has 
failed to establish that the transcripts are necessary for consideration of the 
issues raised on appeal, he has failed to demonstrate any violation of his 
Constitutional rights. 3 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues is one 
of deference to factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous, but free 
review of whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the 
facts found. State v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375, 380, 79 P.3d 734, 739 (Ct. App. 
2003); State v. Smith, 135 Idaho 712, 720, 23 P.3d 786, 794 (Ct. App. 2001 ). 
3 If this case is assigned to the Idaho Court of Appeals, it is without authority to 
directly review, and find erroneous, a decision of the Idaho Supreme Court. 
State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618, _, 288 P.3d 835, 837 (Ct. App. 2012). 
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C. The Requested Transcripts Are Not Necessary For Fair Consideration Of 
The Issue On Appeal 
A defendant in a criminal case has a due process right to "a record on 
appeal that is sufficient for adequate appellate review of the errors alleged 
regarding the proceedings below." State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 462, 50 P.3d 
472, 477 (2002) (citing Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Lane v. 
Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963); Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. Of Prison Terms 
and Paroles, 357 U.S. 214 (1958); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)); see also 
State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618, _, 288 P.3d 835, 838 (Ct. App. 2012). The 
state, however, "will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily" to provide 
transcripts that "will not be germane to consideration of the appeal." Draper, 372 
U.S. at 495; see also M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 123 (1996) (indigent 
appellant has right to "a transcript of relevant trial proceedings"). 
Rather, an indigent defendant is entitled, at state expense, to only those 
transcripts and portions of the record necessary to pursue the issues raised on 
appeal. Griffin, 351 U.S. 12; Lane, 372 U.S. 477. "[T]he State must afford [the 
indigent appellant] a record complete enough to allow fair appellate consideration 
of his claims." S.L.J., 519 U.S. at 121. To demonstrate that the record is not 
sufficient, the defendant must show that any omissions from the record 
prejudiced his ability to pursue the appeal. See State v. Polson, 92 Idaho 615, 
620-21, 448 P.2d 229, 234-35 (1968) (distinguishing Martinez v. State, 92 Idaho 
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148, 438 P.2d 893 (1968)). See also United States v. Smith, 292 F.3d 90, 93 
(1st Cir. 2002). 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction only to review the district court's order 
denying Tapia-Lopez's oral Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence after the 
court revoked his probation and ordered his original sentence imposed.4 
(Compare I.AR. 14(a) (notice of appeal must be filed within 42 days of order 
challenged on appeal) with R., pp.109-111 (notice of appeal filed within 42 days 
after order revoking probation and imposing sentence).) Tapia-Lopez has been 
afforded a full transcript of the hearing that resulted in that order. (12/13/11 Tr.; 
5/4/12 Tr.) Transcripts of the guilty plea, sentencing, and rider review hearings 
are unnecessary because this Court lacks appellate jurisdiction to review the 
orders that issued from those respective hearings. More importantly, transcripts 
of those hearings were not prepared and were not presented to the district court 
in relation to the probation violation proceedings and there is no indication that 
what was said at those hearings played any role in the ruling challenged on 
appeal - the denial of Tapia-Lopez's oral Rule 35 motion. The transcripts are 
simply unnecessary for appellate review of the only order within the scope of this 
Court's appellate jurisdiction. 
4 Although this Court would have appellate jurisdiction to review the district 
court's decision to revoke Tapia-Lopez's probation and impose his original 
sentence, he has not challenged those orders on appeal - only the court's denial 
of his oral Rule 35 motion following the first two orders. 
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Tapia-Lopez first asserts that without the denied transcripts the record will 
be incomplete and his claim will not be reviewed on its actual merits. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.10.) He does not even posit how the transcripts are 
necessary, however. (Id.) A naked statement that the transcripts are necessary 
is not proof that rights were violated. 
Tapia-Lopez next asserts that "a court is entitled to utilize knowledge 
gained from its own official position and observations" and therefore a defendant 
is entitled to any transcript that might have contributed to the knowledge gained 
by the judge. (Appellant's Brief, pp.10-12 (citing cases).) Accepting this 
reasoning would, taken to its logical conclusion, entitle every criminal appellant to 
a transcript of every hearing ever presided over by the trial judge; a proposition 
unsupportable in the law. In this case the record establishes that all of the 
evidence presented in the hearings Tapia-Lopez wants transcribed is in the 
appellate record. The PSI and APSI are in the record and no witnesses were 
called at the three hearings Tapia-Lopez wants transcribed. (R., pp. 43-44, 59, 
73.) Tapia-Lopez's argument is necessarily that some argument or comment-
by himself, the attorneys, or the judge-was so influential at the probation 
revocation proceeding held approximately one and one-half years later that a 
transcript of the earlier proceedings is necessary to review for an abuse of the 
district court's discretion. This argument is, at best, speculative. The current 
record is more than adequate for appellate review of the claim that the district 
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court abused its discretion by denying Tapia-Lopez's oral Rule 35 motion after it 
revoked probation and imposed his original sentence. 
The requested transcripts are not necessary to pursue the appellate claim 
of abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of Tapia-Lopez's oral Rule 35 
motion requesting leniency. Tapia-Lopez's speculative claim that he cannot have 
a fair review of the merits of his issue without the requested transcripts do not 
establish a violation of his Constitutional rights to due process, equal protection, 
or effective assistance of counsel. 
11. 
Tapia-Lopez Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion By 
Denying His Rule 35 Motion For Leniency 
A. Introduction 
Tapia-Lopez next asserts that the district court abused its discretion when 
it denied his oral Rule 35 motion for leniency. 5 (Appellant's Brief, pp.19-22.) 
However, because Tapia-Lopez has failed to establish an abuse of discretion, 
this Court must affirm the district court's sentencing determination. 
5 At the beginning of the probation revocation hearing, Tapia-Lopez's counsel 
informed the district court that Tapia-Lopez would be admitting the violation and 
intended to "go ahead with disposition, expecting the imposition or asking that 
the court may reconsider the three-plus-nine-for-twelve sentence that was 
imposed." (Tr., p.4, Ls.19-22.) 
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B. Standard Of Review 
"Sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion." State v. 
Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 823, 965 P.2d 174, 183 (1998) (citing State v. Wersland, 
125 Idaho 499, 873 P.2d 144 (1994)). 
C. The District Court Acted Well Within Its Sentencing Discretion In Denying 
Tapia-Lopez's I.C.R. 35 Motion 
If a sentence is within applicable statutory limits, a motion for reduction of 
sentence under Rule 35 is a plea for leniency, and this Court reviews the denial 
of the motion for an abuse of discretion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho, 201, 203, 
159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). To prevail on appeal, Tapia-Lopez must "show that 
the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently 
provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion." kl 
At the outset of the probation revocation hearing, Tapia-Lopez's counsel 
informed the district court: 
Your Honor, in this particular case I believe [Tapia-Lopez 
has] already been sentenced in Cassia County as [sic] time 
imposed. He has charges of interest with the federal authorities, so 
they intend to take and prosecute him, so it's our intent in this case 
to admit that he violated conditions of probation as set forth: That 
he returned to the United States without proper documentation and 
did not report as required to probation and parole for supervision. 
(Tr., p.4, Ls.9-17.) After Tapia-Lopez admitted the probation violations, his 
counsel recommended that the fixed portion of Tapia-Lopez's sentence be 
reduced from three years to one year, explaining, "that may give the Board of 
Corrections [sic] a chance to turn him over earlier than they might otherwise and 
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let the federal authorities - we're not sure if they'll take him before his fixed time 
is done. So we'd ask the court to consider reducing the time to one year and 
then we'll see what happens with the federal authorities." (Tr., p.7, Ls.16-21.) 
That was the only new information presented to the district court at the probation 
revocation hearing. 
The district court was not persuaded to reduce Tapia-Lopez's fixed term in 
the hope that federal authorities would take custody over him earlier. The court 
explained: 
The court is well aware that in Cassia County Case 2009-
7587 I did revoke your probation last week and imposed sentence, 
therefore you're not a candidate for probation at this time. Your 
conduct in this case was willful and warrants revocation of 
probation by returning to the United States illegally, when you were 
advised not to do so as a term and condition of probation, and by 
failing to report to probation for supervision as required by the 
terms and conditions of your probation. Therefore I will revoke your 
probation, impose the suspended sentence. The request to modify 
the original sentence is a matter of discretion with the court. That 
sentence was the product of a plea agreement that was imposed by 
the court pursuant to that plea agreement. At this point I'm not 
persuaded that there's any reason to now change the plea 
agreement and modify that sentence, so I will not do so. 
(Tr., p.7, L.25 - p.8, L.16.) 
The district court denied Tapia-Lopez's Rule 35 motion to reduce the fixed 
portion of his sentence to one year in light of his unlawful return to the United 
States after being deported and failure to report to probation for supervision, and 
because the court was not presented with any compelling reason to grant such 
reduction. The mitigating factors Tapia-Lopez cites on appeal were all reflected 
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in the record and presumably well known before he violated his probation in 2011 
by returning to the United States illegally and failing to report for supervision. 
Those apparently undisputed factors6 led the court to give Tapia-Lopez two 
earlier opportunities to remain on probation and out of prison: (1) placing him on 
a rider, which he successfully completed; and (2) placing him on probation. 
None of the mitigating factors cited by Tapia-Lopez (i.e., the nature of the 
offense, substance addiction, work ethic, good performance in rider programs) 
constituted new information to the court when it considered Tapia-Lopez's oral 
Rule 35 motion. 
Tapia-Lopez also "argues that his deportation status is a mitigating 
factor[,]" and that "[t]he harshness of the deportation is exacerbated because of 
his significant ties in the United States." (Appellant's Brief, p.20.) However much 
deportation may serve as a mitigating factor in some situations, it is not a factor 
that can be addressed here because there has been no argument, much less 
showing, that a reduction of Tapia-Lopez's fixed term has any connection to 
whether he is subject to deportation. See State v. Tinoco-Perez, 145 Idaho 400, 
179 P.3d 363 (Ct. App. 2008) (Rule 35 motion to reduce sentence was based on 
understanding that if the unified sentence was more than 364 days, defendant 
was subject to mandatory deportation, but not otherwise). Unless deportation 
6 At the probation revocation hearing, the prosecutor said that Tapia-Lopez had 
done "well" on his rider and then was deported, and that "the main obligation he 
had on probation was not to reenter the country illegally." (Tr., p.6, Ls.24.) 
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can be avoided by a reduction of a sentence, there is no justification for reducing 
a sentence, otherwise deserved, on the basis that the defendant will be returned 
to his or her country of origin after the sentence is served. 
Further, Tapia-Lopez was deported after he was placed on probation 
following his rider and re-entered the country illegally. Tapia-Lopez's current risk 
of being deported does not differ from when he was originally sentenced, as the 
PSI noted in 2010, "[Tapia-Lopez] is not a legal resident and currently has a 
Border Patrol hold for deportation upon completion of his sentence in this 
matter." (PSI., p.8.) Therefore, Tapia-Lopez's anticipated deportation was not a 
"new" factor presented to the district court in his Rule 35 motion to reduce his 
sentence. 
In sum, Tapia-Lopez has failed to show that his sentence is excessive in 
light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the district court in 
support of his motion to reduce his sentence. Huffman, 144 Idaho at 203, 159 
P.3d at 840. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
order denying Tapia-Lopez's Rule 35 motion for leniency. 
DATED this 1st day of April, 2013. 
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